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Bank stock performance and bank regulation
around the globe
Abstract
We analyze the effect of bank capital, regulation, and supervision on the annual stock performance
of global banks during the period of 1999-2012. We study a large comprehensive panel of inter-
national banks and find that higher Tier 1 capital decreases a bank’s stock performance over the
whole sample period. However, during turbulent times stocks of more highly capitalized banks
perform significantly better. Additionally, we find strong evidence that banks that are more likely
to receive government bailout during financial distress realize smaller stock performance. In con-
trast, we find no convincing evidence that banks that generate higher non-interest income have a
higher performance.
Keywords: Bank stock performance, bank regulation, capital, implicit bailout guarantee.
“Banks are somehow making gigatons of money despite onerous new regulations and capital
requirements. Why, it’s almost like they’re not telling the truth when they warn, repeatedly, that
these new rules will destroy their profits and the economy.”
The Huffington Post, 07/16/2013
1 Introduction
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, excessive risk-taking caused by a “search for
yield” (see Rajan, 2005) and the tendency of deposit-taking banks to earn more non-interest income
through activities like, e.g., investment banking have been criticized for contributing to the sever-
ity of the recent financial crisis (see, e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2012).1
Responding to these claims, many commentators have called for stricter bank regulation, bank
supervision, and, in particular, for higher capital requirements (see, e.g., Kashyap et al., 2008;
Acharya et al., 2014b; Calomiris and Herring, 2011; Hart and Zingales, 2011).2 Perhaps most
prominently, Ben Bernake argued in 2010 that “stronger regulation and supervision [...] would
have been a more effective and surgical approach to constraining the housing bubble than a general
increase in interest rates”.3 On the other side, banks have repeatedly and insistently contended
that tougher capital requirements will ultimately decrease their profitability, thus in turn decreas-
ing effective capital buffers (see Matutes and Vives, 2000). One the one hand, higher capital ratios
entail a higher cost of capital for banks which in turn could be reflected in the stock performance
of banks. On the other hand, banks which hold more capital should be able to grant more loans
and increase their profits (conversely, of course, banks that are low on capital regularly decrease
their lending to fulfill capital requirements). In summary, the expected effect of capital on bank
performance is not clear ex ante.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several studies in the financial economics literature have
1 The adverse side-effects of bank risk-taking on financial stability have also been addressed earlier by, e.g.,
Bernanke (1983), Keeley (1990) and Calomiris and Mason (1997).
2 The diverse causes of and lessons from the recent financial crisis are also discussed by Brunnermeier (2009) and
Gorton (2010).
3 Joseph Stiglitz took the same line and argued that the lax regulation of U.S. banks prior to the Subprime crisis
was to be blamed for contributing significantly to the build-up of systemic risk, see Stiglitz (2008).
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tried to examine these claims more objectively and in more detail (see, e.g., Aiyar et al., 2012;
Jime´nez et al., 2014). Our paper contributes to the research on the relation between the different
facets of bank regulation and supervision on the one hand and bank performance on the other
hand using a large international dataset. We investigate in this paper how bank regulation and
supervision can explain differences in the performance of banks around the world. In particular,
we address the question whether higher capital, tougher supervision, incentives and capabilities
for the private sector to monitor banks, and higher capital requirements have led to shrinking bank
profits and losses in shareholder value.
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests several distinct channels through which the
performance of banks might be related to bank regulation. With bank capital requirements at
its core, the regulation of financial institutions aims at installing additional buffers against po-
tential losses and at limiting the risk-taking of banks by reducing the incentives of shareholders
and managers to take on more risks than socially optimal (see Kim and Santomero, 1994). At the
same time, requirements to hold more bank capital might also prove counterproductive as banks
might react to more stringent capital requirements by pursuing a riskier investment strategy (see
Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Buser et al., 1981). Furthermore, Laeven and Levine (2009) show
that the relation between bank risk-taking and bank regulation depends critically on each bank’s
ownership structure. Turning to the second facet of bank regulation, policy-makers could also at-
tempt to limit bank risk-taking by introducing activity restrictions. For example, banks could be
prohibited to engage in activities that are not related to deposit-taking and lending and that are
deemed to be too risky by regulators (see Boyd et al., 1998). The empirical evidence on the ef-
fects of activity restrictions, however, is mixed with findings differing significantly over the past
decades. For instance, Cornett et al. (2002) show in their study that Section 20 activities under-
taken by banks after 1987 resulted in increased industry-adjusted operating cash flow return on
assets with bank risk remaining unchanged. The argument that banks profit from less restrictions
on their activities is also taken up by Barth et al. (2004) who argue that activity restrictions re-
duce competition, limit economies of scope, and may ultimately result in a loss in bank efficiency.
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Further key aspects of a regulatory regime include entry requirements, the supervisory policy, and
governance (see, e.g., Ellis et al., 2014).
As economic theory and empirical work provide conflicting results, our paper contributes sig-
nificantly to this rich literature in banking. We address the need for a comprehensive analysis
of the relation between bank regulation and bank performance and study the determinants of the
buy-and-hold return for a large sample of international banks from 1999 to 2012. We concentrate
on the banks’ regulatory and supervisory environment and estimate panel regressions of the stock
performance of banking firms on variables on a country’s regulatory and supervisory system taken
from the database of Barth et al. (2013a) while controlling for several idiosyncractic factors (e.g.,
bank size, Tier 1 capital, non-interest income, interconnectedness, and leverage).
We empirically test various hypotheses from the financial intermediation literature on the ef-
fects of bank capital, bank regulation, and supervision using a sample of 11,803 bank-year ob-
servations from 1,659 publicly listed international banks from 74 countries. Over our complete
sample period, we find evidence in support of the view that higher bank capital decreases a bank’s
stock performance. However, we find strong evidence that higher Tier 1 capital ratios significantly
increase banks’ stock performance during times of a financial crisis. Moreover, we find evidence
that investors value bank stocks based on their capitalization relative to their peer-groups rather
than their absolute capitalization. Additionally, we observe that private monitoring, guidelines on
asset diversification, and entry requirements into the banking sector are negatively related to the
performance of banking firms. In contrast, we show that with the ability of supervisory authorities
to discipline banks, their annual buy-and-hold returns increase. Also, better corporate governance
yields better stock performance. Analyzing the effect of implicit government bailout guarantees,
we find that banks that are more likely to receive government support realize an inferior stock
performance. In particular, we find that both a bank’s size and a bank’s interconnectedness with
the global financial sector are negatively related to its stock performance. Interestingly, while we
do find that higher Tier 1 capital decreases performance, we find no convincing evidence that the
extent to which banks generate non-interest income significantly influences a bank’s performance.
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Moreover, our analysis of a large sample of international banks yields insights to the influence of
financial crises on the drivers of a banking firm’s performance. For example, we find that while
leverage is not a significant driver of bank performance over the whole sample, it plays a significant
role during crisis periods.
The empirical work in this study is related to several recent papers on the factors that influence
banks’ performance. Our paper is most closely related to the recent study by Berger and Bouwman
(2013) which is concerned with the effects of bank capital on both, survival rate and market share.
The authors find that capital helps small banks to increase the probability of survival and their
market share during crises and normal periods while medium and large banks only have higher
survival rates and market shares during crises periods. However, their study is restricted to U.S.
banks and focuses on survival rates and market shares. Our analysis on the other hand focuses
on the effects of regulation on banks’ stock performance for a large panel of international banks.
Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) analyze the bank performance of 347 U.S. banks using stock return data
for 1998 and 2006. The authors find that banks that performed poorly during the 1998 crisis
also performed poorly during the financial crisis of 2006. As they further show, banking firms
that relied more on short-term funding and had more leverage are more likely to perform poorly
during both crises. However, the authors are only concerned with U.S. banks during 1998 and
2006 while our study exploits the variation in national bank regulation and supervision over the
period from 1999 to 2012 to explore the determinants of banks’ stock performance. Also, our
study is related to Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who study the buy-and-hold stock returns of a sample
of large international banks over the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008. The authors
find evidence that banks that rely on short-term financing had poor performance during the crisis.
They show that better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before
the crisis. However, the authors restrict their study to large banks with total assets larger than
$50bn and only consider the crisis period. In contrast, our paper studies both crises and non-crises
periods for a large comprehensive panel of international banks. Hence, we also include smaller
banks in our analyses. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2013) analyze the effect of different types of capital
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ratios on bank stock returns and show that a higher capital position leads to stronger performance
during the latest crisis. The authors find that this effect is particularly pronounced for large banks
and stronger when higher quality forms of capital are considered. Finally, Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011) study the connection between bank performance and CEO incentives before the crisis using
a sample of 95 U.S. banks from 2006.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data and discuss the expected
influence of various idiosyncratic and regulatory variables on financial stability. In Section 3, we
document our main findings on the drivers of systemic risk. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample and presents the choice of our main
independent variables as well as descriptive statistics of our data.
2.1 Sample construction
Our initial sample consists of all 22,560 firms included in the active and dead-firm “banks” and
“financial services” lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. To rule out the possibility that
some commercial and investment banks are erroneously listed in the “financial services” instead of
the “banks” category in Datastream, we build our initial sample using both lists. We then follow
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and select all companies with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300
(i.e., we eliminate insurers, real estate operators, holding and investment offices as well as other
non-bank companies in the financial service industry from our sample). Furthermore, we require
a bank to have available accounting data in Thomson Worldscope to be included in our sample.
Next, we omit a stock from our sample if it is identified in Datastream as a non-primary quote,
if it is a secondary listing or if it is an American Depositary Receipt (ADR). Additionally, we
exclude from our sample all OTC traded stocks and preference shares. Our final sample consists
of 3,813 international banks for which we have at least one year of accounting data available. For
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our sample banks, we need to have daily stock price data available in Datastream. Consequently,
we remove another 45 banks from our sample, due to missing stock price data. In the following,
we apply the filtering process proposed by Hou et al. (2011) and Karolyi et al. (2012).
As noted first by Ince and Porter (2006), stock prices in Datastream suffer from several minor
data errors. To correct for the confounding effect of these errors, we perform several screening
procedures on the daily return of the banks’ stock prices. First, we require a bank to have a
minimum share price of $1 at the end of a month for the bank-month to be included in our sample.
We treat as missing any return above 300 percent that is reversed within one month. In case the
number of zero return days exceeds 80 percent of a given month, we follow Hou et al. (2011) and
exclude the entire bank-month. Furthermore, we define non-trading days as those days on which
90 percent or more of the listed stocks have zero returns. All non-trading days are then excluded
from our sample. Finally, as we are interested in the influence of regulatory capital on banks’ stock
performance, we exclude all banks with missing data on Tier 1 capital from our sample. In case
we have no remaining bank-year for an individual bank, we exclude the bank from our sample. In
total, we end up with a sample of 1,659 international banks from 74 countries for the time period
1999 to 2012. Table I shows the distribution of the 11,803 bank-years across each country.
[Place Table I about here]
2.2 Bank characteristics
Our analysis is concerned with the factors influencing stock performances of banks around the
globe. Consequently, we use a bank’s annual buy-and-hold stock return as dependent variable in
our panel regressions.4 In the following, we describe our independent variables. To begin with, we
control for several idiosyncratic bank characteristics that are well-known to influence bank stock
prices. Furthermore, for each nation in our sample, we collect a set of country-specific variables
that proxy for a bank’s regulatory environment and other macroeconomic factors.
4 Note that the dependent variable is adjusted for cash dividends and stock splits.
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First, we include information on a bank’s regulatory capital as the main independent variable
in our regressions. We use the variable Tier 1 capital which is defined as the ratio of Tier 1 capital
to total risk weighted assets.5 Tier 1 capital is the component of a bank’s capital that has the
highest quality and is therefore capable to absorb losses without affecting the day-to-day business
of the bank and may thus improve overall bank performance. As already pointed out, regulators
use capital requirements to limit the risk-taking of banks by having shareholders participate in the
losses. For example, Ciha´k et al. (2012) find that crisis countries used lower actual capital ratios.
Conversely, higher Tier 1 capital could induce less profitability of a bank, since it is the most costly
form of capital that a bank can raise. Also, bank managers argue that more bank capital might lead
banks to a riskier investment strategy. As a result, we do not have an undisputed expectation of
the influence on banks’ stock performance. By including Tier 1 capital in our regression analyses,
we (indirectly) check for possible positive and negative effects of stricter capital requirements on
a bank’s stock performance.
As additional measures for a bank’s capital, we include several other measures. First, we
include the tangible common equity ratio defined as tangible equity divided by tangible assets.
Moreover, we include the Tier 1 leverage ratio defined as Tier 1 capital divided by total assets and
the Tier 2 leverage ratio defined as Tier 2 capital divided by total assets. In our main analysis,
we focus on the effect of Tier 1 capital on bank performance as, e.g., Anginer and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
(2014) show that Tier 2 capital has a destabilizing effect as it is less able to absorb losses.
Next, we control for differences in the size of a bank by taking the natural logarithm of a bank’s
total assets at the end of the fiscal year. The literature reveals ambiguous findings on the interplay
of the size of a bank and its individual stock performance. Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find that,
in contrast to non-financial firms, size is a priced factor in the cross-section of bank stock return,
i.e., investors expect a discount when buying stocks of large banks as these are more systemically
5 Das and Sy (2012) study the usefulness of risk weighted assets and argue that they do not predict market mea-
sures of risk. Additionally, Mariathasan and Merrouche (2013) find that risk weighted assets predict bank failure
only when the risk of a crisis is very low. See, e.g., Gauthier et al. (2012); Hanson et al. (2011) for a more de-
tailed discussion of the potential disadvantages associated with the use of risk weighted assets. Further studies
concerning risk weighted assets include, e.g., Acharya et al. (2014a).
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relevant and, due to implicit bailout guarantees, less risky than stocks of banks that are smaller.
Irrespective of the banks’ leverage, larger commercial bank stocks have significantly lower risk-
adjusted returns than small- and medium-sized bank stocks. Underlining this finding, Aebi et al.
(2012) show that bank size was negatively related to the stock performance of banks during the
recent financial crisis. On the other hand, increased bank size might result in a higher market power
and as a consequence increase stock performance. As a result, we have no clear prediction for the
sign of the coefficient on bank size in our panel regressions.
In our analysis, we use several measures to control for different types of bank risk. To proxy for
a bank’s systematic risk and thus a bank stock’s sensitivity to a given benchmark market index, we
employ in our regressions the bank’s beta. We calculate a bank’s beta as the covariance between the
returns on the bank’s stock and the returns of the MSCI World index divided by the variance of the
bank’s stock returns. A higher beta denotes a positive correlation of the benchmark index and the
stock’s movements and should therefore reflect a good performance during good economic times
and worse stock performance in financial crises. We also include the z-score measure proposed by
Altman (1968) in our analysis to control for bank’s risk.
To additionally control for the systemic risk of a bank, we use two measures for the expo-
sure and contribution of an individual bank to systemic risk. To be precise, we employ three
prominent measures of systemic risk from the literature: the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES),
SRISK, and a bank’s ∆CoVaR. In our analysis, the MES of an individual bank’s stock is calcu-
lated as the negative average stock return on the days the MSCI World Index experienced its 5%
worst outcomes (see Acharya et al., 2010). In addition, the SRISK is the capital that a firm is ex-
pected to need conditional on a crisis, i.e., S RIS K = Ei,t[CapitalS hort f alli | Crisis] proposed
by Acharya et al. (2012). The authors argue that the measure merges size, leverage, interconnect-
edness and the comovement of the firm’s assets with the total financial sector in a single mea-
sure. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015) define the unconditional ∆CoVaR as the difference of the
Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sector index conditional on the distress (in the 5% quantile) of a
particular bank and the VaR of the sector index conditional on the median state of the bank.
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Thus, the ∆CoVaR measure captures an individual bank’s contribution to systemic risk. We
would expect a bank’s exposure to crises to be negatively associated with the bank’s stock per-
formance. At the same time, however, we also expect a bank’s contribution to systemic risk to
be negatively correlated with its stock performance as higher systemic importance increases the
probability of a bailout (and thus reduces the risk premia in stock returns). Note that these three
measures, even though they are associated with systemic risk, capture different aspects of systemic
risk.
As a way of measuring firm value, we employ a bank’s market-to-book ratio calculated as the
market value of common equity divided by the book value of common equity. Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012) for instance find evidence for a positive relation of a bank’s buy-and-hold returns and the
market-to-book ratio. Therefore, we would expect a positive impact of market-to-book ratio on a
bank’s stock performance. Next, we include in our analysis the variable return on assets (ROA) as
a standard measure of a firm’s profitability. Naturally, we would expect a positive relation between
a bank’s profitability and its stock performance. Finally, to control for differences in the banks’
stocks, we employ the Amihud measure of an individual stock’s illiquidity adjusted following the
procedure proposed by Karolyi et al. (2012) as a further control variable (Liquidity).6
We include several variables to control for differences in the business model of a bank. First,
we define the variable Loans as the ratio of a bank’s total loans to total assets. When loans are
higher, banks’ regulatory capital is expected to be less impacted by increases in credit spreads,
which could reduce the values of securities (see, e.g., Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Additionally, we
define the variable Loan loss provisions as the natural logarithm of a bank’s expenses set aside
as allowances for uncollectable or troubled loans divided by total loans. Uhde and Heimeshoff
(2009) show that this proxy for a bank’s quality of its loan portfolio is negatively related to the
bank’s performance.
Another bank-specific variable we consider in our main regressions is Deposits, which is cal-
culated as total deposits divided by total liabilities. A higher value for Deposits indicates a less
6 Note that, in contrast to the original Amihud measure, the adjusted Amihud measure proposed by Karolyi et al.
(2012) is increasing in the stock’s liquidity.
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fragile funding of the bank, which could serve as a stabilizing factor for firm performance.7 On
the other hand, a bank that is mainly funded by deposits might be less active in non-traditional
banking activities, which could limit possible streams of income. To investigate this hypothesis,
we also include the ratio of non-interest income and total interest income in our main regressions.
In a related study, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) empirically show that banks that generate higher
non-interest income have a higher contribution to systemic risk than traditional banks. Next, we
consider a bank’s funding in our analyses by including the variable Debt maturity. The latter is the
ratio of total long term debt (due in more than one year) to total debt. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) find
evidence that the poor performance of banks during the recent financial crisis was partly due to a
stronger reliance on short-term funding. In our analyses, we expect the coefficient of debt maturity
to enter our regressions with a positive sign (see also Adrian and Shin, 2010). Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012) find empirical evidence that the leverage of a bank has a negative influence on a bank’s
stock return during the crisis period. Therefore, we add a proxy for a bank’s leverage to our set
of independent variables. In particular, we follow Acharya et al. (2010) and calculate the variable
leverage as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided
by market value of equity and expect it to enter our regressions with a negative coefficient.
2.3 Regulatory and macroeconomic environment
The focus of our empirical study lies on an analysis of the relation between the regulation of
domestic banking sectors and an individual bank’s stock performance. In particular, we investigate
whether differences in stock performance can be explained by differences in the bank’s country-
specific regulatory environment. We obtain data on the regulatory environments from the database
of Barth et al. (2013a) that is based on four surveys performed between 1999 to 2012 on the reg-
ulation and supervision of banks in 180 countries. Unfortunately, not every variable is available
for every year of our full sample period from 1999 to 2012. Nevertheless, we update missing
7 A low value for Deposits indicates high overnight money market funding and hence, fragile funding. A a conse-
quence, Basel III integrates a ratio for stable funding.
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data points with the most recent data since adjustments of the regulatory and supervisory environ-
ment are relatively rare and result from a relatively slow political process (see Barth et al., 2004;
Anginer et al., 2014b). First, we employ a measure of the degree to which official supervisory
authorities are allowed to actively prevent or correct instances of corporate wrongdoing by banks.
The index of the official supervisory power ranges from zero to 14, where higher values denote
greater power of the authorities. One could argue that more powerful regulators are able to prevent
excessive risk-taking by banks before and during crises. At the same time, however, more powerful
supervisors could also limit banks in their range of investment opportunities. Therefore, we have
no expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient in our regressions.
As our next step, we take advantage of a variable that proxies for differences across countries
in the way firms are restricted in their engagement in banking activities or are ostracized from
banking markets. For example, Ongena et al. (2013) find that the lower the barriers to entry and
the tighter the restrictions on bank activities in domestic markets are, the more they are associated
with lower banking standards in domestic and foreign markets. Additionally, empirical investi-
gations show that the risk-taking of banks is sensitive to domestic regulation and restrictions on
(foreign) market entry and bank activities (see, e.g., Barth et al., 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2009;
Buch and DeLong, 2008). We start with the variable Activity Restrictions taken from the database
of Barth et al. (2013a). The index of the overall restrictions on banking activities measures to which
extent a bank is allowed to engage in securities, insurance or real estate activities. The variable
ranges from three to twelve, twelve denoting the greatest restrictiveness. Ellis et al. (2014) identify
key planks of any well-defined regulatory regime, one of which are entry requirements. As a con-
sequence, we also control for differences in entry requirements in a country by employing an index
of the legal requirements that need to be fulfilled before a banking license is issued. The entry
requirements index ranges from zero to eight, where eight denotes the greatest stringency. Next,
we consider the private monitoring index and diversification index from the database of Barth et al.
(2013a). The former describes the incentives and capabilities that are provided by regulatory and
supervisory authorities to encourage the private monitoring of banks. Ciha´k et al. (2012) find ev-
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idence that the private sector in crisis countries had weaker incentives to monitor banking firms’
risks. Additionally, Caprio Jr. et al. (2014) find that higher levels of private monitoring negatively
impinge the probability of a crisis. Thus, we expect that a small score of the index (which ranges
from 0 to 12) is associated with weaker stock performance. The diversification index proxies
for a country’s guidelines for asset diversification and loan giving abroad. Higher guidelines on
diversification lead to a more balanced investment portfolio. However, diversification does not
necessarily increase value for shareholders. Also, one might argue that more diversification leads
to the lack of a core business. This line of argumentation is also supported by the rich literature on
mergers (see, e.g., DeYoung et al., 2009). Additionally, Mercieca et al. (2007) find no evidence in
support of beneficial effects of direct diversification on bank performance. Finally, we control for
the stringency of capital regulation on the banking system. The capital regulatory index captures
whether capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses
from capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined. It ranges from zero to ten, where
ten indicates the highest degree of stringency of capital regulation. Barth et al. (2013a) show that
capital requirements have been adjusted to greater stringency over the last decade. Unfortunately,
the capital regulatory index is not available for all countries in our sample for the whole sample
period.
To control for the overall economic conditions and possible business cycle fluctuations in each
country, we obtain data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database on
the annual growth rate of the real gross domestic product (in %) and the inflation rate. We suspect
that a bank’s opportunities for investments are correlated with different business cycles. These
opportunities might arise in times of economic growth and, consequently, have a positive effect
on the overall performance of a bank. For example, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find
evidence that both a low GDP growth and a high inflation rate increase the likelihood of systemic
banking sector problems which could worsen a bank’s stock performance due to spillover effects.
Finally, to control for the competition in a given country’s banking sector, we employ the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the squared market shares of a country’s
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domestic and foreign banks. Anginer et al. (2014a) find a positive relation between bank compe-
tition and systemic stability as greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified
risks, hence making the banking system as a whole less fragile to shocks. Consequently, we expect
an ambiguous effect of competition on banks’ stock performances. On the one hand, competi-
tion should decrease the profit margins of banks, leading to less pronounced buy-and-hold returns.
However, on the other hand, following the argumentation of Anginer et al. (2014a), competition
protects investors from an otherwise higher exposure to systemic risk, thus leading to a better bank
stock performance.
2.4 Additional variables controlling for possible government bailouts
It could be argued that a bank’s interconnectedness rather than its size drives its systemic
risk and thus the probability of a potential bailout by the government in a scenario of market
stress.8 Consequently, a bank’s stock performance could also be affected by the bank’s degree
of interconnectedness with the financial sector as investors price implicit bailout guarantees for
too-interconnected-to-fail banks. To control for this, we employ our variable Interconnectedness
which is defined as the number of in- and outgoing granger causalities of the banks’ stock returns
as proposed by Billio et al. (2012). As before for bank size, we expect an ambiguous influence of
interconnectedness on the banks’ stock performance.
Next, Bertray et al. (2013) show that bank shareholders differentiate between a bank’s absolute
size and its systemic size. Thus, while we check for size and systemic relevance of a bank, it is
crucial to include an indicator of systemic relevance relative to the local economic environment
in our regressions. Therefore, we define the variable Systemic size as the ratio of a bank’s total
liabilities to national GDP. As Bertray et al. (2013) show that growing to a size that is systemic
is not in the interest of a bank’s shareholders, we expect a negative influence of systemic size on
banks’ stock performance.
8 For the importance of the interconnectedness of financial institutions for global financial stability, see, e.g.,
Black et al. (2012), Arnold et al. (2012) and Billio et al. (2012).
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Another key plank of a well-defined regulatory regime is governance (see Ellis et al., 2014).
Hence, in our further analyses, we additionally include an index that measures the quality of corpo-
rate governance in a given country. As Santos (2001) notes, capital standards may be an important
instrument to implement the optimal governance of banks because they can be used to define the
threshold for the transfer of control from shareholders to regulators. Ideally, a good governance
environment should be the basis of a smooth bank business operation and should therefore be re-
flected in the annual stock performance. Ellis et al. (2014) argue that this aspect of a regulatory
regime is often neglected. We calculate two versions of a corporate governance index, employing
the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank. The simpler version is calcu-
lated as the arithmetic mean of the six constituent variables. Additionally, we consolidate the six
factors using a principal component analysis to account for possible commonalities in the variables
(see also Barth et al., 2013b). Aebi et al. (2012) study bank performance during the financial crisis
2007/2008 and find evidence that better corporate governance is related to better performance.
2.5 Bank stock performance
In the first step of our empirical study, we analyze several descriptive statistics of our sample
banks’ stock performance, the bank-specific explanatory variables as well as our controls regarding
the banks’ regulatory environment. Figure 1 plots the time evolution of the mean, 10%-, and 90%-
quantile of the sample banks’ buy-and-hold returns across our full sample.
[Place Figure 1 about here.]
Average stock performance peaked in the year 2003 during which banks even in the 10%
quantile of stock performance experienced a stock performance of above 10%. As expected, overall
stock performance dropped in the years of the financial crisis with its minimum in the year 2008.
Here, the top-performing bank stocks achieved an annual return of 8.4% on average. A similar
result holds for the year 2011. Interestingly, the 90%-percentile of the annual buy-and-hold returns
had its peak in 2009, directly after the crisis years, whereas the bottom percentiles remain relatively
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low. These first findings show that bank stocks performed quite differently both before, during, and
after the financial crisis, thus underlining the importance of our main research question. In Figure
2, we further investigate this differential stock performance of banks in our sample by comparing
the stock performance of banks in six selected countries.
[Place Figure 2 about here.]
Note that while the U.S. banking sector’s average stock performance began to rise from 1999
to 2003, the 90%-quantile of the stock performance of Japanese banks declined, and the opposite
trend can be observed for the period from 2003 to 2005. This is likely linked to the patterns in
GDP of these two countries. Moreover, for all of the six countries, we find a sudden and steep
drop in the average bank’s stock performance in 2008 with only slightly positive buy-and-hold
returns in the 90%-quantile in the U.S. and Japan. After the crisis, the bank stocks recovered to a
certain amount with some banks in the United Kingdom and Germany having annual buy-and-hold
returns of above 50%. In contrast, banks in India and Malaysia had extremely high stock returns
both before and after 2008, with banks in the top 90%-percentile of annual buy-and-hold returns
being well above 100%.
Next, we comment on several descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables
presented in Table II that are later used in our panel regressions.
[Place Table II about here.]
From Table II, we can see that all our variables exhibit significant variation, both across time
and across banks. First, we can see that banks in our sample differ considerably with respect to
their respective business model and funding strategy. In particular, the variables Loans and Non-
interest income as well as Leverage and Debt Maturity show significant variation in our panel data
set. On average, the variable Loans decreases steadily across all banks in our sample (from 65%
to 61%) while Non-interest income increases significantly. However, Non-interest income shows
a significant spike in 2009 and 2010. Also, the debt maturity of banks increases, on average,
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across all banks in our sample, as does leverage. However, the average leverage of banks exhibits
a significant drop between 2005 and 2007.
Even more interestingly, the amount of regulatory capital also shows significant variation, both
across time and banks. For example, several banks from the United States feature high Tier 1
capital ratios, whereas 143 banks from different countries show regulatory capital ratios below 1%
over our entire sample period. However, from 1999 to 2012, we observe a significant upward trend
in average Tier 1 capital ratios.9
As far as the Interconnectedness between banks is concerned, we find that the ten most inter-
connected banks from our sample are all from the United States. We find average values of our
measure of a bank’s interconnectedness to have increased from 1999 to 2012. This is in line with
Engle et al. (2014), who argue that the degree of interconnectedness between banks has increased
as a result of rising globalization. Note however, that the we observe the highest degree of in-
terconnectedness in 2000. Finally, we also find significant time variation in the variables on the
banks’ regulatory environment.
In Table III, we present the Pearson correlations between the independent variables used in our
regression analyses.
[Place Table III about here.]
As can be seen from the estimates in Table III, most variables are not significantly correlated
with each other. Not surprisingly, we observe very high correlation between the Tier 1 capital
ratio and the Tier 1 leverage ratio (.995) as well as the tangible equity ratio (.816). Similarly,
the correlation between the Tier 1 leverage ratio and the tangible equity ratio is very high, while
the Tier 2 leverage ratio does not exhibit very high correlations with the other capital measures.
Moreover, several of our regulatory variables exhibit stronger correlations with the macroeconomic
controls. Consequently, these variables are not used jointly in the regressions presented in the next
section to minimize the risk of multicollinearity biasing our findings.
9 These findings are also underlined by Cohen and Scatigna (2014) who confirm that capital ratios have increased
steadily since the financial crisis and analyze different channels of adjustment.
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In the upcoming sections, we try to explain the found differences in the stock performance of
banks by estimating panel regressions in which we employ both our country-specific variables on
bank regulation and the idiosyncratic bank characteristics.
3 The influence of regulation on stock performance
In this section, we present the results of our analyses on the determinants of banks’ stock per-
formance. We begin by analyzing whether stricter regulation, e.g., in the form of higher regulatory
capital requirements leads to a decrease in stock performance. Next, we investigate whether bank
stock performance is significantly affected by regulators via implicit bailout guarantees. Finally,
we take a closer look at the determinants of banks’ stock performance during times of financial
crises.
3.1 Does stricter bank regulation lead to worse stock performance?
For the analysis of the determinants of a bank’s stock performance, we estimate panel regres-
sions with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the bank level.10
More formally, we will estimate regressions of the following form:
Buy-and-hold returni,t = β1 · Bank capitali,t−1 + βBank controls · Xi,t−1
+ βRegulatory · Yi,t−1 + βCountry controls · Zi,t−1 + ui + vt + ǫi,t
We run several regressions to identify the determinants of a bank’s stock performance. In all our
regressions, we use the banks’ yearly log buy-and-hold returns as our dependent variable. First,
we regress a banks’s stock performance on a set of bank-specific variables. We control for any
unobserved variables with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects. We do not include country-fixed
effects due to multicollinearity. In further regressions, we include additional control variables
10 As the residuals are not correlated across both time and banks, this procedure is valid. For further comments see,
e.g., Thompson (2011) or Beck and De Jonghe (2013).
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on the banks’ regulatory and macroeconomic environment to determine which country-specific
factors drive the stock performance of banks. We lag all our explanatory variables by one year to
mitigate the problem that our dependent variables and some of our independent variables could be
determined simultaneously.
In additional analyses, we exploit the multilevel structure of our data. To be specific, we
aim to distinguish where the effects we observe arise, at the country level and at the individual
firm level. This allows us to understand the country- and firm-level determinants while at the
same time controlling for nesting effects and endogeneity. We follow Martin et al. (2007) and
Li et al. (2011) and employ a hierarchical nested form of the general linear model. This not only
allows us to dismantle the country- and the firm-level effects of the explanatory variables, but also
considers that banks within a country are more similar to each other and weights the precision
of the bank-level data according to different sample sizes across countries. We follow Li et al.
(2011) and perform some data manipulation before running the HLM estimations. More precisely,
we center all independent variables by its overall mean, estimate country-level mean values, and
finally calculate within-country firm-level deviations by subtracting the country-level means from
the centered variables. Then, we include both the firm-level deviations as well as the country-level
means in our models.
[Place Table IV about here]
In our baseline regressions in Table IV, we use the banks’ yearly log buy-and-hold return as the
dependent variable. The results of our baseline panel regressions show that a bank’s Tier 1 capital
ratio is negatively related to the bank’s stock performance. This result is statistically significant
at the 1% level. At least for our full sample, however, this result is only marginally economically
significant as a one standard deviation increase in Tier 1 capital yields a decrease in a bank’s
annual stock return of just 0.2% (0.003 × 0.6787311). This finding contributes to the on-going
discussion of the regulation of banks’ equity capital. On the one hand, Tier 1 capital represents
a bank’s capital of the highest quality. Consequently, public opinion and regulators repeatedly
call for tougher capital regulations. In a recent paper, Bostandzic et al. (2014) find that higher
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Tier 1 capital decreases both the exposure and contribution of individual banks to systemic risk.
On the other hand, bank managers argue that higher capital requirements negatively affect bank
performance. Blum (1999) shows that increasing capital requirements could also lead to increased
risk-taking. Our result supports the conjecture that stock investors view higher capital ratios as
being detrimental to a bank’s ability to generate profits. However, this result is economically
of marginal magnitude. We attribute this finding to the fact that while investors might consider
high capital ratios undesirable in normal times, investors could, at the same time, favor stocks
or highly capitalized banks during a financial crisis. Berger and Bouwman (2013) find empirical
results in support of this line of argumentation as they show that capital helps banks to increase
the probability of survival and their market share during crises periods. On average, however, we
show for our full sample that high ratios of regulatory capital are seen critically by stock investors.
We can confirm the results with our hierarchical model. The estimates provide evidence that the
result is driven by firm deviations and does not arise at the country level.
To further analyze the relation between bank capital and bank performance, we perform some
additional analyses. First, we estimate our baseline model using different capital measures. We
include the Tier 1 leverage ratio and the Tier 2 leverage ratio in alternative models and estimate
these using the HLM approach (Table IV, Models (2) and (3)). Model (2) is in line with our
findings so far. A higher Tier 1 capital ratio is associated with lower bank stock performance.
Note that in the context of the leverage ratio, this results seems to arise at the country level which
could be driven by the different implementation levels of capital requirements and the calcula-
tion of risk-weighted assets in the countries in our sample.11 Le Lesle´ and Avramova (2012) re-
port evidence of differences in the calculation of risk-weighted assets across (and within) regula-
tory regimes. Moreover, the authors observe decreasing risk-weights over time most prominently
among European banks, who were granted more flexibility than those under US-regulation (see
also Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2013). These documented differences in risk-weighted assets
11 Note that this result may also be a consequence of the smaller sample as we do not have data on the additional
capital measures available for our complete sample. Additional evidence for that reasoning is also brought
forward by the results in Table V, Model (3).
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are not only the result of bank-specific characteristics such as the calculation of RWA, the banks’
business model or risk profile, but also arise due to different supervisory practices. The latter
did arise primarily due to divergences in the implementation of Basel II by domestic supervisors
(Le Lesle´ and Avramova, 2012). In contrast to the Tier 1 capital ratio, or the Tier 1 leverage ratio,
we observe a positive relation between the Tier 2 leverage ratio and the bank stock performance.
Again, this result seems to arise at the country level. We attribute this finding to the fact that Tier
2 capital is less costly than Tier 1 capital. Next, we employ the Tangible equity ratio to capture a
bank’s capital. The results shown Column (4) of Table IV confirm our finding that higher capital
is related to lower bank stock performance.
In our next step, we split our sample into halves based on the banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio in a
given bank-year. The top half consists of all banks that feature Tier 1 capital ratios above the mean
while the bottom half consists of all banks whose Tier 1 capital ratio is below the average. Our
conjecture is that stock market investors favor banks that are not undercapitalized but divest from
banks that hold too much capital relative to their competitors within a regulatory regime. We then
run separate panel regressions for each subsample using time-fixed and bank-fixed effects as well
as clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level) to test this conjecture. The results of our
additional panel regressions are shown in Table IV, Columns (5) to (6).
We observe that Tier 1 capital ratios are negatively associated with annual buy-and-hold re-
turns for banks that feature above-average regulatory capital ratios. At the same time, this result
disappears for banks that demonstrate below-average capital ratios. Consequently, our results indi-
cate that our finding of a negative relation between Tier 1 capital and banks’ stock performance is
mainly driven by banks with high Tier 1 capital ratios. At the same time, we find no evidence that
below-average capital ratios increase bank performance. Another interesting result from the re-
gressions based on subsamples is that a bank’s stock performance is not related to its MES or Beta
if the bank is highly capitalized (Model (5)). In this scenario, the default probability decreases and,
consequently, different types of risk are no longer relevant for investors. However, as capital ratios
decrease, both, MES and Beta, are negatively associated with banks’ stock performance (Model
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(6)).
Next, we try to shed more light on the question whether the capitalization of banks relative to
their competitors is priced by stock market investors. Irrespective of the overall capital require-
ments that affect all banks in a given country, investors could favor the stocks of those banks that
hold more (or less) capital than the average competitor. To this end, we introduce the new vari-
able Capital Requirement Deviation which we define in the following way. First, we calculate the
mean of the variable Tier 1 capital for all banks with the same realization of the Capital Regulatory
Index, or, more exactly, for all banks that face a similar capital stringency. In a second step, we cal-
culate the differences between the individual banks’ Tier 1 capital and the respective mean values
for each bank. Hence, our variable Capital Requirement Deviation captures the extent to which a
bank’s capital deviates from the average of peers in the same CRI group, i.e., the average value of
regulatory capital of banks within the same group of capital stringency.12 We then repeat our base-
line regression and additionally include the new variable Capital Requirement Deviation (Model
(7)). We find a statistically significant (5% level) negative influence of the Capital Requirement
Deviation on a bank’s stock performance. At the same time, the previously observed influence
of the variable Tier 1 capital disappears. The results on our other idiosyncratic bank character-
istics remain qualitatively unchanged. Our results are thus strongly supportive of the notion that
investors indeed value bank stocks based on their relative rather than their absolute capitalization.
Banks that had more Tier 1 capital relative to their peers working under a similar capital stringency
had significantly lower annual buy-and-hold returns. This result supports the argumentation of
Calem and Rob (1999). The authors argue that the relationship between bank capital and risk is
U-shaped.
[Place Table V about here.]
Turning to the relation between different risk measures and a banks stock performance, we
find that a bank’s exposure to systemic risk is associated with a lower stock performance (Table
12 Note that the Pearson correlation between the variables Tier 1 capital and the Capital Requirement Deviation is
38%.
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IV, Model (1)). The result is also economically significant as a one standard deviation increase
in our proxy for a bank’s systemic risk exposure (MES) yields a decrease of the annual stock
return of -3.7% (0.171 × 0.2172). This result is line with our intuition as a bank with a higher
systemic risk exposure is hit harder in the event of a system-wide crash. The hierarchical analysis
provides evidence that this result emerges at the country level. We can confirm the results with
the SRISK measure (Table V, Model (2)). In Model (1) of Table V, we substitute the MES by the
bank’s estimate of ∆CoVaR as a measure of its contribution to systemic fragility. In contrast to our
previous finding, a bank’s contribution to systemic risk does not have any statistically significant
impact on the institution’s stock performance in our panel regressions. However, our hierarchical
model shows a statistically significant coefficient at the country level. Finally, we include the z-
score proposed by Altman (1968) as an alternative measure for (bankruptcy) risk (Table V, Model
(3)). As expected, we observe a significantly positive coefficient (higher values of the z-score
indicate less bankruptcy risk).
Taking a look at our control variables, our analyses provide additional evidence that supports
the notion that size is negatively correlated with bank performance. As banking firms increase in
size, so does their systemic importance and the implicit probability of a government bailout in case
of default. These findings are in line with the results of Gandhi and Lustig (2015) who argue that
size is a priced factor in the cross-section of bank stock returns due to implicit bailout guarantees.
Furthermore, our findings are in support of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) who argue that
for large banks downsizing or splitting up might increase their value. However, we cannot confirm
these finding using the hierarchical model. In additional, unreported regressions, we exclude the
largest and the smallest banks from our sample, respectively, which does not change our main
findings on the relation between bank capital bank bank stock performance.
Additional results also show that high-valued stocks yield a lower buy-and-hold return than
stocks with low valuation. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level, economically sig-
nificant, and large, as a one standard deviation increase yields a decrease in performance of -56.3%.
Further along, we control for differences in the banks’ lagged performance and find evidence for
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reversal in the banks’ returns. To be specific, we find that a bank’s performance is negatively influ-
enced by its lagged performance. Similar findings are reported by Beltratti and Stulz (2012). Not
surprisingly, banks that earn a high return on their assets also have a better annual stock perfor-
mance. This effect is of large economic importance. A one standard deviation increase in return
on assets implies an increase in the annual log buy-and-hold return of 36%. We also control for
differences in the banks’ stock liquidity. Underlining the findings of Han and Lesmond (2011), we
find that an individual stock’s illiquidity is negatively associated with its performance. Turning to
a bank’s business model, we find that by taking deposits, banks increase their annual buy-and-hold
stock return in our sample period (see also Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) while giving loans decreases
the annual stock return. We trace this back to the fact that loans are associated with a small profit
margin and thus, banks with a large loan portfolio are realizing a decreased performance. Of major
importance is the quality of the loan portfolio measured by loan loss provisions. As the quality
of the loan portfolio decreases, so does the annual buy-and-hold return of the banking firm. The
economic importance of this influence is large. Furthermore, banks with more deposits have a less
fragile funding structure than, for example, banks that invest in overnight money market funds.
As a result, deposits are associated with better stock performances. In a more broad approach, we
control for the business model of a bank using industry fixed effects. This approach allows us to
distinguish between, e.g. universal banks or bank holding companies. The results presented in
the Appendix (Table II, Model (1)) show that these differences do not influence our main results.
Estimating (unreported) subsample regressions for the different industry groups we observe that
our main results are especially driven by Commercial Banks, Investment Companies, Securities
Brokerage Firms, and Miscellaneous Financial Firms. On the other hand, holding commercial
banks exhibit a slightly positive coefficient and for Savings & Loan Holding Companies we do not
observe a coefficient different from zero. Similarly, we control for different accounting standards
employing an accounting fixed effect (Table II, Model (2)). The results show that this additional
control does not influence our main results. Surprisingly, neither a firm’s degree of leverage nor its
non-interest income has significant influence on the buy-and-hold returns in our large comprehen-
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sive panel. Also the amount of short-term funding measured by debt maturity has no significant
influence on the performance. We can confirm these findings with the hierarchical approach.
[Place Table VI about here.]
Turning to the influence of the regulatory and supervisory environment on a bank’s annual
buy-and-hold return, we add several variables that describe the banks’ regulatory and supervisory
environment to our models (Table VI). We start by adding one regulatory variable at a time while
in Models (6) and (7), we include more than one regulatory variable at the same time. As men-
tioned earlier, some of our regulatory variables are highly correlated both with each other and
with our macroeconomic control variables. For example, the index of the Official Supervisory
Power and the Diversification Index are negatively correlated with a correlation of -54%. As a
consequence, we can only include one of these two variables in our regressions at a time. Addi-
tionally, we observe a strong negative correlation between variables that proxy for the supervisory
environment of a country and country-specific controls such as GDP growth, inflation, and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. To minimize multicollinearity problems, we do not use highly cor-
related variables simultaneously in a regression. In additional unreported regressions, we include
the country control variables instead of our regulatory variables. The results on the idiosyncratic
bank characteristics remain qualitatively unchanged.13
We find evidence that higher incentives for a better private monitoring are associated with a
lower stock performance of banks (Table VI, Model (1)). We argue that increased capabilities for
the private sector to monitor banks are linked to additional efforts for the banking firms. Conse-
quently, these additional cost lead to a worse stock performance. Another possible explanation
for this result is that with more incentives for the private sector to monitor banks, banks are more
cautious with their investment strategies and consequently earn lower profits. Next, higher values
of the Diversification index that captures the guidelines for asset diversification are also associated
with a lower stock performance (Table VI, Model (2)). Our results show that more asset diversifi-
13 We do not report the additional results as the focus of our paper is on the influence of the regulatory and supervi-
sory environment on banking performance.
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cation leads to a poorer stock performance of banks in our full sample. We argue that with stricter
guidelines for asset diversification, banking firms lack a core business. At the same time, banks
have better diversified asset portfolios. Consequently, our findings support both lines of argumen-
tation as with stricter guidelines for diversification, the stock performance of banks decreases. In
contrast, higher Activity Restrictions are associated with better stock performance. We argue that
banks that are not allowed to engage in non-traditional banking activities focus on their core busi-
ness and as a result earn higher profits in this area. Moreover, we find that with more supervisory
power, the stock performance of banks increases. With increasing power of supervisors, banking
problems are recognized earlier and corrected more promptly. Finally, we find evidence that ad-
ditional legal entry requirements to obtain a banking license lead to a lower stock performance of
banks in a given country. Ongena et al. (2013) argue that lower barriers to entry are associated
with lower bank lending standards abroad. Hence, investors could be more cautious which in turn
leads to smaller annual buy-and-hold returns. In the final two regressions of Table VI (Models (6)
and (7)), we include several variables that proxy for our sample countries’ regulatory environments
simultaneously and confirm our findings from the previous regressions. In additional unreported
results, we include a dummy variable that captures the existence of a deposit insurance scheme in
a given country. However, we find no convincing evidence of any influence of the variable on the
annual stock performance of banks.
Also, we study the influence of capital requirements captured by the Capital Regulatory In-
dex introduced by Barth et al. (2013a) on a bank’s stock performance. However, we do not find
any convincing evidence that the annual buy-and-hold return is related to the stringency of cap-
ital requirements. Hence, we conclude that investors rather base their investment decisions on
idiosyncratic bank characteristics than on country-level characteristics. Additionally, the Capital
Regulatory Index captures capital stringency, but is not directly based on a required minimum cap-
ital ratio. In contrast, the variable Tier 1 capital captures a bank’s actual amount of regulatory
capital within a single (realized) ratio.
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3.2 Implicit bailout guarantees and bank stock performance
In additional analyses, we are interested in the relation between a bank’s stock performance
and possible implicit bailout guarantees. The results from our main regressions in Table IV pro-
vide some evidence on the relation between a bank’s size on its stock performance. More precisely,
we find that with increasing size measured by the logarithm of a bank’s total assets, the annual buy-
and-hold return of banking firms decreases. Also, we find evidence that an increased exposure to
systemic risk measured by a bank’s MES or SRISK is associated with a declining stock perfor-
mance. To further analyze the relation between a bank’s stock performance and implicit bailout
guarantees, we now turn to several additional regressions in which we focus on indicators of sys-
temic risk and possible bailout guarantees. Again, to detect the determinants of a bank’s stock
performance, we estimate panel regressions with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using standard
errors clustered at the bank level. The results of our additional panel regressions are shown in
Tables VII and VIII.
[Place Table VII about here]
In our models (1) through (5) in Table VII, we run regressions that are very similar to our
baseline regressions. In contrast to the regressions in the previous section, however, we also include
our proxy for an individual bank’s interconnectedness with the financial sector in the regressions.
Just like with bank size, we expect more interconnected banks to be more systemically important
(see also Chan-Lau, 2010) and thus provide weaker stock performance. Our results provide strong
evidence that more interconnected banks realize a smaller annual buy-and-hold stock return than
other banks. The results are statistically (at the 5% level) and economically significant. Again,
we find support for the notion that investors view more interconnected banks to have an increased
probability of receiving a government bailout (see also Bertray et al., 2013).
Next, we analyze in more detail the question whether different indicators of systemic risk also
drive banks’ stock performance. One could argue that the sheer size of a banking firm as it is
captured by the logarithm of a bank’s total assets is not the best indicator to measure whether the
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institution is too-big-to-fail. For example, Bertray et al. (2013) propose to use the systemic size of
an institution rather than its total assets as a proxy for systemic relevance. The authors use the ratio
of liabilities over GDP to identify systemically important banks. Table VIII shows the results of
our analyses in which we employ systemic size as an alternative proxy for the systemic importance
of a bank.
[Place Table VIII about here]
In models (1) through (8), we replace the variable Total assets by the variable Systemic size.
Interestingly, we cannot find any statistical evidence that the Systemic size of a banking firm has
influence on the stock performance of the institution. Our other results remain qualitatively un-
changed. This result underlines the findings by Bertray et al. (2013) who argue that investors dis-
tinguish between banks’ absolute size and systemic size. However, the variable systemic size also
captures the costs of a bailout for the government. Hence, the variable systemic size additionally
measures the degree to which a country is affected by a possible bailout of a banking firm in case
of financial distress. As a consequence, the systemic size of a bank captures two contra-directional
features. Accordingly, the variable does not significantly influence the annual buy-and-hold return
of a bank
In models (3) and (4), we additionally include a variable that measures the quality of the corpo-
rate governance of a given country. The variables are calculated using the Worldwide Governance
Indicators provided by the World Bank. The variable Governance is an arithmetic mean of the
six indicators on Corporate Governance provided by the World bank. However, a better index of
Corporate Governance might consist of some underlying commonality found in the six indicators.
Consequently, we perform a principal component analysis to extract the common factor of the
individual indicators and include the variable Governance (pca) in an additional regression. Re-
gardless of the calculation method of the index we include to measure the quality of the corporate
governance in a country, we find evidence for the notion that better corporate governance yields
better stock performance. Consequently, we find evidence that supports the hypothesis that a bet-
27
ter corporate governance environment allows banks to run their business more soundly and solidly,
which in turn results in higher annual buy-and-hold returns.
3.3 Bank’s stock performance during crises times
Our analyses so far have revealed strong correlations between bank capital and bank stock
performance. As mentioned above, however, these effects could differ significantly during times
of financial crisis. As a result, we now turn to an in-depth analysis of the factors that drive a
bank’s performance during turbulent times. Complementing the main regressions discussed in the
previous subsections, we also investigate the robustness of our results during crisis- and non-crisis
times, respectively. To identify periods of financial crisis, we rely on the database on systemic
banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2012). We then perform several regressions in
which we employ the same set of variables as in Table IV but additionally include a dummy
variable that takes on the value one if a country experienced a financial crisis in a given year,
and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include several interaction terms with our crisis dummy to test
the differential effect of several explanatory variables on bank performance during and outside
of crises. Again, we estimate panel regressions of the annual buy-and-hold return with clustered
robust standard errors (at the bank level) as well as time-fixed and bank-fixed effects. The results
are presented in Table IX.
[Place Table IX about here.]
The estimated models in Table IX provide evidence on the effect of turbulent times on a bank’s
performance. The results show that during crisis periods, a higher Tier 1 capital ratio significantly
increased a bank’s stock performance (Model (1)). The result is economically significant and
large. A one standard deviation increase in Tier 1 capital yields an increase in the dependent
variable of 84%. Thus, while a higher Tier 1 capital yields only a marginal decrease in stock
performance during calm times, during turbulent times, a higher Tier 1 capital ratio induces a
significantly better stock performance. This result supports the argumentation that Tier 1 capital
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shields banks from adverse effects spilling over from the financial sector to individual institutions.
Also, this result is in line with the argumentation of Berger and Bouwman (2013) that banks with
more capital also have a higher probability of survival, a possibly higher market share, and thus
a better stock performance. At the same time, this result is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz
(2012) and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2013) who show the positive influence of Tier 1 capital during
the financial crisis. The result is confirmed in Model (2), where we replace the risk-adjusted capital
ratio with the leverage ratio. Similar to Model (1), we observe a negative relation during non-crisis
periods, but a strong positive relation during crisis periods. In Model (3), we study the relation
between the Tier 2 leverage ratio and bank stock performance during crisis times. We observe a
negative relation between the Tier 2 leverage ratio and the bank stock performance during crisis
times. In line with the argumentation brought forward by Anginer and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt (2014), we
attribute this finding to the fact that Tier 2 capital has a destabilizing effect as it is less able to absorb
losses. Thus, Tier 2 capital is associated with higher performance during calm periods, but not
during crisis periods. Overall and in line with previous findings in the literature (Beltratti and Stulz,
2012; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2013), we find that capital is relevant for bank performance during
crisis times, and higher quality forms of capital are more relevant.
Further along, we find that while leverage does not have a significant influence on a bank’s
stock performance over the whole sample period, during crisis times, more highly levered banks
realize a significantly lower return than other banks. The economic significance of this result is
large (66.5% decrease in our dependent variable for a one standard deviation increase in leverage).
This finding is also underlined by Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) who confirm that the leverage of a bank
had a negative influence on the bank’s stock performance during the financial crisis. One possible
explanation for this finding could be that banks with higher leverage also had a more fragile funding
and were thus more vulnerable during the recent crisis. However, we find no statistical evidence
that a bank’s debt maturity is significantly related to a bank’s annual buy-and-hold return.
While we find some evidence for our full sample that banks with more loans in their portfolio
realize smaller annual buy-and-hold stock returns, this effect is even more pronounced during crises
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times. We find strong empirical evidence (significant at the 1% level) that banks with more loans
have significantly lower stock returns during a crisis. The result is also economically significant
and in line with the results of Ciha´k et al. (2012) who find that for the global financial crisis,
countries had less stringent regulations on the treatment of bad loans. Also, the finding underlines
the argumentation of Engle et al. (2014) who argue that leverage is more serious when the economy
is weak.
Finally, we analyze the relation between the interconnectedness of a bank with other banking
firms during times of a financial crisis. We show that during crisis times, a bank’s stock perfor-
mance decreases significantly as its interconnectedness increases. Again, this result is significantly
more pronounced during crisis times than for the complete sample period. In line with our intu-
ition, this evidence highlights the importance of interconnectedness among financial institutions
during crises. As interbank linkages are to some degree unknown, for highly interconnected firms
the risk of contagion increases during crises periods. To be specific, only direct linkages to other
banks are known, while information about linkages of higher degrees are rare. As a result, with
increasing interconnectedness a bank’s stock performance decreases.
3.4 Additional regressions
In additional analyses, we study the differences between countries included in our sample. We
classify the countries of origin of our sample banks into different categories. To be specific, we
build the following subsamples: G7-countries, G7-countries excluding the U.S., the U.S., and non
G7-countries. We perform additional (unreported) panel regressions in these subcategories focus-
ing on bank capital, and observe inconclusive results. For example, we find that the influence of
risk-adjusted Tier 1 capital ratio on stock performance is mainly driven by US banks. We ob-
serve negative coefficients for the other subsamples, but not statistically significant different from
zero. In contrast, the results involving the Tier 1 leverage ratio are mainly driven by G7 exclud-
ing the U.S. banks, and the tangible equity ratio result arises from looking at non-G7 banks. We
argue that the different capital measures reflect the different implementation statuses of the reg-
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ulatory requirements in the countries in our sample as noted by (Le Lesle´ and Avramova, 2012;
Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2013). For example, banks with the same Tier 1 leverage ratio that
are located in different countries may exhibit different Tier 1 capital ratios due to different im-
plementation statuses of regulatory regimes and different calculation methods for risk-weighted
assets.
Our sample includes banks from different bank groups. Generally, such differences are cap-
tured with bank-level fixed effects. Nevertheless, we construct dummy variables from Datastream
that account for different types of banks (“industry group dummies”). We estimate one model
including these regressions in our main analysis and find no significant differences in our results.
Moreover, we estimate (unreported) some subsample models focusing on different industry groups.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient observations for each group to provide all results. But,
we do find the negative relation between Tier 1 capital and bank stock performance for several
industry groups.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effects of bank capital, bank regulation, and supervision on
banks’ stock performance. We analyze a comprehensive panel of international banks over the
period of 1999-2012 with 11,803 bank-year observations from 1,659 banks in 74 countries. We
employ panel regressions to study the determinants of each bank’s annual buy-and-hold return
using bank-specific as well as country-specific and regulatory explanatory variables.
The key result of our empirical study is that higher regulatory capital is negatively related to
the banks’ stock performance over our complete sample period from 1999 to 2012. However,
during turbulent times, higher regulatory capital significantly increases a bank’s annual stock per-
formance. In addition, we find evidence that supports the notion that implicit government bailout
guarantees decrease bank stock performance. To be specific both, a bank’s size measured by its
total assets and a bank’s interconnectedness with other banking firms, are related to weaker stock
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performance. Furthermore, we find evidence that better supervision and corporate governance are
beneficial to bank stock performance. At the same time, schemes supporting the private monitoring
of banks are negatively related to annual buy-and-hold returns.
The implications of our results are twofold. First, while higher bank capital indeed decreases
overall bank performance, this result is of marginal magnitude. However, as higher Tier 1 capital
ratios significantly increase performance during crisis times, regulation appears to be on the right
track, increasing regulatory capital requirements around the world since the recent financial crisis.
Finally, we confirm in our panel setup that size and systemic relevance of banks negatively influ-
ence banks’ stock performance. In line with earlier findings in the literature, bank stock returns are
significantly lower for larger and systemically more important banks that are more likely to receive
a government bailout.
Although we find higher capital to be beneficial during times of crisis, we do not address the
question how high capital requirements should ideally be. We intend to tackle this question in
future research.
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Appendix I: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used
in the empirical study. The bank characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Thomson Worldscope databases. The country control variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicator (WDI) database. Data on the banks’ regulatory environment are taken from Barth et al. (2006) and
Barth et al. (2013a).
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
Buy-and-hold return Log annual buy-and-hold stock returns computed from the first and last trading day in a year. Datastream, own. calc.
Bank characteristics
Beta Beta of a stock calculated as the ratio of the covariance of the stock’s return and the MSCI World Index return and the
variance of the stock’s returns in one year.
Datastream, own calc.
Z-score Natural logarithm of the z-score. The z-score is calculated as the sum of a bank’s equity ratio and annual return on
assets divided by the standard deviation of daily stock returns in that year.
Worldscope, Datastream, own calc.
MES Annual Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by Acharya et al. (2010) as the average return on an individual bank’s
stock on the days the World Datastream Bank index experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own calc.
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015), measured as the difference of the Value-at-risk
(VaR) of a financial sector index conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR of the sector index
conditional on the median state of the insurer.
Datastream, own calc.
Total assets Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at fiscal year end. Worldscope (WC02999).
SRISK Annual SRISK as defined by Brownlees and Engle (2015) as S RIS K = k ·DEBTi,t(1−k) ·
(
1 − LRMESi,t
)
·EQUITYi,t ,
where LRMESi,t is 1 − exp(−18 · MESi,t). The variable used is S RIS K+ = (S RIS K; 0)+ with k = 8%.
Datastream, Worldscope, own calc.
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Worldscope (WC07210 and
WC03501).
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by market value of equity (see
Acharya et al., 2010).
Worldscope (WC02999, WC03501,
WC08001), own calc.
Non-interest income Non-interest income divided by total interest income. Worldscope (WC01021 and
WC01016).
Loans Ratio of total loans to total assets. Worldscope (WC02271 and
WC02999).
Loan loss provisions Natural logarithm of expenses set aside as an allowance for uncollectable or troubled loans divided by total loans. Worldscope (WC01271 and
WC02271).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251 and
WC03255).
Deposits Total deposits divided by total liabilities. Worldscope (WC03019 and
WC03351).
Return on assets Pre-tax return of the insurer on its total assets. Worldscope (WC08326).
Systemic size Ratio of a bank’s total liabilities to national GDP. Worldscope (WC03351), WDI
database.
Liquidity Mean value of the Amihud measure of an individual stock’s illiquidity adjusted following the procedure proposed by
Karolyi et al. (2012). The adjusted Amihud measure is defined as − ln
1 +
∣∣∣∣Ri,t
∣∣∣∣
Pi,t VOi,t
 where Ri,t is the return, Pi,t is
the price, and VOi,t is the trading volume of stock i on day t.
Datastream, own calc.
Interconnectedness Number of in- and outgoing granger causalities as introduced in Billio et al. (2012). own calc.
Industry groups Dummy variables constructed from Datastream that indicate the type of a bank (commercial/investment bank, holding,
etc.).
Worldscope (WC06011)
Reporting standards Dummy variables constructed from Datastream that indicate which reporting standards a bank is following (IFRS, US
GAAP, local, etc.).
Worldscope (WC07536)
Appendix I: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
Variable name Definition Data source
Bank capital
Tier 1 capital ratio Ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-weighted assets. Worldscope
(WC18156,WC18157).
Tangible equity ratio Total common equity minus total intangibles and preferred stock divided by total assets minus total net intangible other
assets.
Worldscope (WC02300,WC03451,
WC02649,WC07230,WC02649).
Tier 1 leverage ratio Tier-1-capital divided by total assets. Worldscope
(WC18228,WC02300).
Tier 2 leverage ratio Tier-2-capital divided by total assets. Worldscope
(WC18229,WC02300).
Capital Requirement Deviation Captures to which degree a banking firm’s capital deviates from group average. own calc.
Regulatory environment
Activity Restrictions Index of the overall restrictions on banking activities that measures the extent to which a bank can engage in securities,
insurance, and real estate activities. Index ranges from 3 to 12. Higher scores denote greater restrictiveness.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Capital Regulatory Index Index of the stringency of capital regulations in the banking system, capturing whether the capital requirement re-
flects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is
determined. Index ranges from 0 to 10. Higher values denote greater stringency.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Official Supervisory Power Index of the extent to which supervisory authorities have the authority to discipline banks by taking specific actions to
prevent and correct problems. Index ranges from 0 to 14. Higher scores denote greater power.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Diversification index Index of the guidelines for asset diversification. Index ranges from 0 to 2. Higher scores denote more diversification. Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Entry requirements Index of the legal requirements that need to be fulfilled before issuance of the banking license. Index ranges from 0 to
8. Higher scores denote greater stringency.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Private monitoring index Index of the incentives and capabilities provided by regulatory and supervisory authorities to encourage the private mon-
itoring of banks. Index ranges from 0 to 12. Higher scores indicate greater regulatory empowerment of the monitoring
of banks by private investors.
Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Deposit insurance funds-to-total
bank assets
The size of the deposit insurance fund relative to total bank assets. Barth et al. (2006, 2013a).
Corporate governance Consolidated index of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators by averaging. World Bank, own calc.
Corporate governance (pca) Consolidated index of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators by using principal component analysis. World Bank, own calc.
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database.
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the squared market shares of a country’s domestic and foreign
banks.
WDI database.
Crisis dummy Dummy variable that equals one if a financial crisis is identified by Laeven and Valencia (2012) in a country for a given
year, and zero otherwise.
Laeven and Valencia (2012).
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Appendix II: Additional regressions of a bank’s stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics over the
period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable.
The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74 countries. Stock market
data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data
are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and
country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI)
Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression
with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level).
P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as
descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Model (1) Model (2)
HLM HLM
firm dev. country mean firm dev. country mean
Lagged return -0.015 -0.101 *** -0.024 -0.108 ***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025)
MES -0.003 -0.730 *** -0.014 -0.664 ***
(0.044) (0.137) (0.044) (0.140)
Beta 0.035 -0.237 * 0.018 -0.109
(0.052) (0.130) (0.051) (0.134)
Total assets 0.001 -0.009 * -0.002 -0.018 ***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Market-to-book -0.037 *** -0.041 *** -0.034 *** -0.037 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Non-interest income 0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Loans -0.131 *** -0.149 * -0.153 *** -0.134 *
(0.035) (0.079) (0.034) (0.078)
Loan loss provisions -2.224 *** -2.207 *** -2.334 *** -2.316 ***
(0.668) (0.668) (0.666) (0.665)
Debt maturity -0.017 -0.150 *** -0.022 -0.079
(0.014) (0.044) (0.014) (0.054)
Deposits 0.162 *** 0.048 0.145 *** 0.053
(0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.040)
Return on assets 0.036 *** 0.036 *** 0.036 *** 0.036 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** 0.004 -0.003 *** 0.017
(0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.019)
Liquidity -4.276 *** -4.594 *** -4.341 *** -4.380 ***
(1.205) (1.530) (1.203) (1.537)
Constant -0.199 * 0.075 **
(0.118) (0.037)
Bank FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes No
Accounting FE No Yes
N 10032 10025
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Time evolution of bank stock performances
The figure shows the time evolution of the annual buy-and-hold returns across our full international sample of banks.
We report the 90%-quantiles (black bars) and the 10%-quantiles (green bars) as well as the mean values (red areas) of
annual buy-and-hold returns.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of banks’ stock performances by country
The figure shows the time evolution of the annual buy-and-hold returns across our full international sample of banks. We report the 10%- (green area) and
90%-percentiles (black bars) of annual buy-and-hold returns in a given country.
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Table I: Distribution of bank years
The table shows the distribution of the 11,803 bank years from 1999 to 2012 among the countries in our sample. The
international sample consists of 1,659 banks and is constructed as documented in Section 2 and by applying several
filters as introduced by Ince and Porter (2006) and Hou et al. (2011).
Country No. of bank-years Country No. of bank-years
Abu Dhabi 28 Lebanon 3
Argentina 7 Lithuania 7
Australia 80 Luxembourg 5
Austria 98 Macedonia 4
Bahrain 10 Malaysia 128
Bangladesh 21 Malta 1
Belgium 25 Mauritius 3
Botswana 1 Mexico 2
Brazil 11 Namibia 2
Bulgaria 3 Netherlands 35
Canada 97 Norway 281
Chile 7 Oman 21
China 69 Pakistan 30
Colombia 1 Peru 3
Croatia 4 Philippines 50
Cyprus 11 Poland 40
Czech Republic 9 Portugal 52
Denmark 441 Qatar 54
Dubai 13 Romania 2
Egypt 13 Russian Federation 32
Finland 32 Saudi Arabia 80
France 111 Serbia 3
Germany 167 Singapore 48
Greece 63 Slovakia 10
Hong Kong 97 Slovenia 3
Hungary 12 South Africa 62
Iceland 7 South Korea 9
India 80 Spain 118
Indonesia 25 Sri Lanka 21
Ireland 26 Sweden 63
Israel 79 Switzerland 148
Italy 398 Taiwan 57
Japan 1263 Thailand 110
Jordan 69 Turkey 74
Kazakhstan 6 Ukraine 1
Kenya 24 United Kingdom 138
Kuwait 35 United States 6660
Table II: Summary statistics.
This table shows selected descriptive statistics of variables used in our regressions. Between variation captures the differences among the levels of different banks
while within variation captures the deviation from individual bank-specific means. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74
countries over the period 1999-2012. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from
the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator (WDI) Database. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I. Total assets is measured in billion U.S.
Dollars; the Systemic Size is given in terms of 10−3.
Variable Observations Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Between Variation Within Variation
Banks Bank-years
Buy-and-hold return 1,659 11,803 0.053 0.398 -0.982 4.273 0.209 0.372
Beta 1,659 11,803 0.041 0.083 -0.531 1.760 0.092 0.045
Z-score 1,114 6,004 0.738 0.868 -4.998 6.726 0.669 0.583
MES 1,659 11,803 0.015 0.075 -0.111 1.819 0.042 0.066
SRISK (in million $) 1,656 11,757 239.333 2,256.150 0.000 917,000.000 1,000.012 1,914.664
∆CoVaR 1,656 10,566 -0.897 4.947 -37.615 37.301 2.983 4.450
Total assets 1,661 11,814 15.272 2.138 10.598 22.285 2.076 0.390
Market-to-book 1,656 11,761 1.538 3.203 -293.851 93.803 2.126 2.823
Leverage 1,656 11,761 14.969 21.523 1.033 716.452 14.102 16.678
Non-interest income 1,659 11,806 0.362 4.890 -0.909 468.005 6.500 2.449
Loans 1,603 11,270 0.677 0.138 0 0.933 0.134 0.059
Loan loss provisions 1,600 11,248 0.007 0.019 -0.226 1.570 0.025 0.012
Debt maturity 1,644 11,648 0.499 0.293 0 1 0.256 0.191
Deposits 1,659 11,801 0.768 0.191 0 0.9922 0.184 0.059
Return on assets 1,558 10,644 1.090 1.417 -27.600 20.640 1.525 0.964
Tier 1 capital 1,659 11,803 0.088 0.703 0.001 0.224 0.171 0.672
Tier-1-leverage ratio 1,214 6,770 0.0846 0.050 0 0.969 0.051 0.025
Tier-2-leverage ratio 1,125 6,205 0.015 0.016 0 0.455 0.0201 0.0078
Tangible equity ratio 1,089 5,570 0.0756002 0.048 0 0.900 0.050 0.022
Liquidity 1,643 11,362 -0.001 0.003 -0.140 0.000 0.003 0.002
Interconnectedness 1,599 9,619 0.073 0.065 0.009 0.578 0.050 0.053
Systemic size 1,659 11,803 0.060 0.335 0.000 10.97 0.249 0.117
Official Supervisory Power 1,586 10,114 12.281 2.169 4 16 2.002 0.795
Diversification Index 1,645 11,513 1.404 0.502 0 2 0.393 0.367
Entry requirements 1,645 11,440 7.480 0.789 0 8 0.697 0.477
Private Monitoring Index 1,628 11,295 8.966 1.189 5 11 0.999 0.798
Capital Requirements 925 3,678 6.785 1.322 3 10 1.211 0.637
Deposit insurance fund to total assets 1,317 5,808 0.000 0.056 -0.060 1.060 0.089 0.026
Corp. Governance (PCA) 1,659 11,803 -0.231 1.173 -4.157 3.207 1.088 0.325
Corp. Governance 1,659 11,803 1.192 0.500 -1.177 1.986 0.629 0.088
GDP growth 1,656 11,802 2.445 2.672 -13.127 26.750 2.552 1.607
Inflation 1,643 11,700 2.276 3.264 -21.582 75.271 3.688 2.139
HHI 1,448 10,039 0.088 0.066 -2.459 0.760 0.060 0.021
Crisis dummy 1,659 11,803 0.270 0.444 0 1 0.302 0.377
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Table III: Correlations of independent variables.
This table shows Pearson correlations between the independent variables used in our main regressions. The sample consists of 1,659 pub-
licly traded international banks from 74 countries over the period 1999-2012. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Fi-
nancial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al.
(2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. Definitions of
variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Log return MES ∆CoVaR SRISK Beta Z-Score Total
assets
Market-
to-book
Leverage Non-
interest
income
Loans Loan loss
provision
Debt ma-
turity
Deposits Return on
assets
Tier 1 cap-
ital
MES 0.107 1
∆CoVaR 0.046 0.024 1
SRISK -0.080 0.145 -0.033 1
Beta -0.055 -0.143 -0.095 -0.018 1
Z-Score 0.279 -0.004 0.043 -0.169 0.106 1
Total assets -0.027 0.096 -0.040 0.246 0.042 -0.255 1
Market-to-book 0.116 0.015 0.005 -0.017 -0.009 0.242 0.025 1
Leverage -0.326 -0.038 -0.022 0.223 -0.023 -0.521 0.161 -0.110 1
Non-interest income 0.003 0.005 -0.007 0.002 0.004 0.024 0.023 0.007 -0.011 1
Loans -0.051 -0.080 -0.018 -0.097 0.011 0.031 -0.151 -0.096 0.056 -0.086 1
Loan loss provision -0.131 -0.006 -0.022 0.022 0.031 -0.353 0.026 -0.080 0.119 -0.005 -0.005 1
Debt maturity -0.026 -0.001 -0.003 -0.028 0.049 -0.057 -0.150 -0.058 0.089 0.010 0.142 0.037 1
Deposits 0.016 -0.029 0.048 -0.218 -0.081 0.032 -0.382 -0.024 -0.115 -0.027 0.089 0.004 0.022 1
Return on assets 0.252 0.034 -0.004 -0.013 0.036 0.451 -0.044 0.279 -0.313 0.089 -0.035 -0.400 -0.020 -0.200 1
Tier 1 capital 0.008 -0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.002 0.357 -0.034 0.003 -0.020 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.012 0.021 1
Tier-1-leverage ratio 0.020 -0.026 -0.004 -0.097 0.095 0.356 -0.383 0.016 -0.223 0.042 0.037 0.059 -0.006 0.028 0.209 0.995
Tier-2-leverage ratio 0.030 0.032 -0.008 -0.003 -0.038 -0.022 0.191 0.038 -0.014 0.060 0.086 0.094 0.005 -0.154 0.018 0.056
Tangible equity ratio 0.080 -0.035 0.038 -0.111 0.151 0.530 -0.384 0.039 -0.371 0.043 0.058 0.025 -0.039 0.039 0.302 0.816
Systemic Size -0.018 0.018 -0.014 0.193 -0.014 -0.092 0.345 0.010 0.062 0.004 -0.127 0.001 -0.080 -0.234 0.014 -0.010
Liquidity 0.030 -0.040 -0.013 0.034 0.146 0.050 0.296 0.031 -0.067 0.011 -0.064 -0.022 -0.052 -0.029 0.037 -0.002
Interconnectedness -0.094 -0.098 -0.034 -0.008 0.330 -0.047 -0.040 -0.021 0.022 -0.006 0.018 0.031 0.035 0.023 -0.034 -0.005
Capital requirements -0.115 -0.050 0.039 -0.040 0.131 0.060 -0.249 -0.089 -0.010 -0.135 -0.028 0.000 0.189 0.251 0.007 0.056
Activity Restrictions -0.009 -0.044 0.057 -0.165 -0.005 0.049 -0.279 -0.014 -0.091 -0.033 -0.019 -0.015 0.065 0.418 -0.039 0.004
Entry requirements -0.041 0.027 -0.056 -0.008 0.132 0.152 -0.113 -0.007 -0.076 -0.001 0.026 0.059 0.011 -0.077 0.035 0.020
Diversification index 0.120 0.035 0.033 -0.022 -0.058 0.144 0.228 0.017 0.042 0.027 0.017 -0.118 0.012 0.076 -0.010 0.002
Official superivsory power -0.083 -0.037 -0.034 -0.116 0.001 0.019 -0.333 -0.040 -0.110 -0.125 -0.049 0.031 0.108 0.491 -0.094 0.013
Private monitoring index -0.069 0.007 -0.018 -0.029 0.096 0.088 -0.098 -0.014 -0.020 -0.015 0.001 0.091 0.079 0.298 -0.102 0.017
Deposit insurance 0.003 0.030 0.045 -0.005 -0.027 -0.070 -0.231 -0.004 -0.054 -0.020 -0.038 -0.037 -0.042 -0.030 0.125 -0.002
Governance 0.004 0.072 -0.025 0.026 -0.158 -0.041 -0.223 -0.069 0.059 -0.003 -0.005 -0.132 0.087 -0.029 -0.101 -0.004
Governance (pca) -0.031 0.015 0.043 -0.068 -0.120 -0.197 0.046 -0.077 0.181 0.027 0.044 0.046 0.008 0.227 -0.171 -0.013
GDP growth 0.097 -0.110 0.007 -0.060 -0.021 0.224 -0.028 0.102 -0.222 -0.021 -0.018 -0.161 -0.180 -0.013 0.301 0.008
HHI 0.047 0.100 0.017 -0.010 -0.069 0.007 0.108 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.045 -0.048 -0.060 0.055 0.004 -0.004
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Table III: Correlations of dependent variables (continued).
Tier-1-leverage Tier-2-
leverage
Tangible equity ratio Systemic
Size
Liquidity Interconn.Capital requirements Activity
restric-
tions
Entry requirements Diversifi-
cation
index
Official supervisory power Private
moni-
toring
index
Deposit insurance GovernanceGovernance (pca) GDP
growth
HHI
Tier-1-capital
Tier-1-leverage 1
Tier-2-leverage 0.066 1
Tangible equity ratio 0.813 0.023 1
Systemic Size -0.115 0.030 -0.117 1
Liquidity -0.062 -0.012 -0.090 0.062 1
Interconnectedness 0.054 -0.014 0.084 -0.018 0.062 1
Capital requirements 0.188 -0.131 0.172 -0.133 -0.056 0.130 1
Activity restrictions 0.093 -0.140 0.073 -0.250 0.058 0.016 0.340 1
Entry requirements 0.191 -0.109 0.093 -0.037 -0.046 0.080 0.186 -0.146 1
Diversifi- cation index -0.128 0.010 -0.049 0.051 0.045 -0.045 -0.278 -0.086 -0.008 1
Official supervisory power 0.150 -0.235 0.026 -0.167 0.053 0.058 0.320 0.438 0.073 -0.072 1
Private monitoring index 0.183 -0.186 0.062 -0.092 0.011 0.065 0.337 0.121 0.325 0.219 0.411 1
Deposit insurance 0.028 0.120 0.070 -0.026 -0.119 -0.021 0.114 0.181 -0.154 -0.399 -0.093 -0.395 1
Governance -0.099 -0.116 -0.200 0.016 -0.089 -0.121 -0.022 -0.162 -0.017 -0.102 0.099 -0.012 0.251 1
Governance (pca) -0.115 0.033 -0.044 -0.120 -0.082 -0.037 -0.115 0.195 -0.189 0.145 -0.096 -0.032 0.028 0.030 1
GDP growth 0.085 0.096 0.206 0.042 0.057 0.016 -0.101 0.026 -0.083 0.086 -0.038 -0.225 0.132 -0.269 -0.205 1
HHI -0.057 -0.033 -0.058 0.056 0.048 -0.040 -0.393 -0.092 -0.043 0.192 -0.105 -0.003 0.065 0.108 0.202 0.055 1
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Table IV: Bank capital and banks’ stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics over
the period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent
variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74 countries.
For Models (5) and (6), the data is divided into two subsamples. The first subsample (Model
(5)) consists of banks whose Tier 1 capital ratio is above the mean while the second subsample
(Model (6)) consists of banks whose Tier 1 capital ratio is below the mean. Model (7) includes
all banks for which a Capital Requirements Index realization is available. Stock market data
are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are
taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and
country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI)
Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression
with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level).
P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as
descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
OLS HLM HLM HLM OLS OLS OLS OLS
firm dev. country mean firm dev. country mean firm dev. country mean
Lagged return -0.142 *** -0.014 -0.100 *** -0.019 -0.276 *** -0.014 -0.294 *** -0.263 *** -0.116 *** -0.178 *** -0.184 ***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.031) (0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030)
MES -0.171 ** -0.003 -0.724 *** 0.063 -1.217 *** 0.067 -1.035 *** -0.194 *** -0.045 -0.289 *** -0.243 *
(0.072) (0.044) (0.137) (0.059) (0.212) (0.063) (0.242) (0.063) (0.116) (0.088) (0.134)
Beta -0.205 ** 0.018 -0.255 * 0.001 -0.310 ** -0.024 -0.274 * 0.242 ** -0.143 -0.309 * -0.447 **
(0.089) (0.051) (0.131) (0.063) (0.145) (0.065) (0.148) (0.120) (0.105) (0.171) (0.191)
Total assets -0.205 *** 0.002 -0.009 0.009 ** 0.008 0.009 ** 0.012 -0.362 *** -0.214 *** -0.224 *** -0.404 ***
(0.022) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.066)
Market-to-book -0.052 *** -0.037 *** -0.041 *** -0.031 *** -0.033 *** -0.035 *** -0.036 *** -0.081 *** -0.125 *** -0.033 *** -0.114 ***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.027)
Leverage 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 ** 0.000 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-interest income -0.021 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.011 -0.010 -0.001 -0.022 -0.003 -0.045
(0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.032) (0.015) (0.061)
Loans -0.266 *** -0.127 *** -0.139 -0.184 *** -0.105 -0.242 *** -0.201 * -0.186 -0.269 ** -0.208 * -1.015 ***
(0.073) (0.034) (0.078) (0.048) (0.102) (0.049) (0.108) (0.147) (0.130) (0.108) (0.156)
Loan loss provisions -2.137 ** -2.193 *** -2.176 *** -3.035 *** 0.108 -3.174 *** -0.191 0.031 -2.720 ** -1.544 -2.725 *
(0.920) (0.667) (0.667) (0.877) (1.126) (0.870) (1.049) (0.037) (1.261) (1.600) (1.575)
Debt maturity -0.013 -0.017 -0.153 *** 0.007 -0.122 ** -0.002 -0.104 * 0.070 * 0.006 -0.031 0.049
(0.022) (0.014) (0.043) (0.021) (0.058) (0.021) (0.060) (0.037) (0.030) (0.034) (0.053)
Deposits 0.212 *** 0.166 *** 0.054 0.300 *** 0.101 ** 0.353 *** 0.208 *** 0.617 *** 0.137 0.266 * 1.017 ***
(0.081) (0.036) (0.035) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.056) (0.125) (0.126) (0.147) (0.171)
Return on assets 0.034 *** 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.045 *** 0.048 *** 0.044 *** 0.046 *** 0.048 *** 0.024 ** 0.048 *** 0.046 ***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.002 *** 0.003 0.753
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.727) (0.542) *
Liquidity -8.245 *** -4.388 *** -4.687 *** -5.670 *** -4.829 *** -5.077 *** -3.777 ** -4.559 ** -8.082 *** -5.690 -15.031 *
(2.199) (1.199) (1.528) (1.377) (1.778) (1.446) (1.775) (2.111) (2.025) (5.505) (8.186)
Tier-1-leverage ratio 0.172 -0.534 *
(0.130) (0.316)
Tier-2-leverage ratio -0.158 4.329 ***
(0.325) (0.731)
Tangible equity ratio -1.289 ***
(0.319)
Capital requirement deviation -0.038 **
(0.017)
Constant 3.010 *** 0.024 -0.065 -0.045 4.904 *** 3.054 *** 3.454 *** 6.108 ***
(0.352) (0.034) (0.148) (0.150) (0.640) (0.497) (0.618) (1.048)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10032 10032 5975 5731 6095 4923 5109 3320
N cluster 1519 1120 1043 1048 865
R2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Adj. R2 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.40
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Table V: Bank risk and banks’ stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics over the
period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable.
The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from 74 countries. Stock market
data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data
are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and
country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI)
Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression
with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level).
P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as
descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
OLS HLM HLM HLM
firm dev. country mean firm dev. country mean firm dev. country mean
Lagged return -0.153 *** -0.016 -0.119 *** -0.017 -0.116 *** -0.012 -0.301 ***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031)
∆CoVaR -0.000 0.000 0.007 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Beta -0.193 ** -0.009 -0.226 * 0.013 -0.158 -0.038 -0.351 **
(0.088) (0.052) (0.128) (0.050) (0.131) (0.062) (0.145)
Total assets -0.219 *** -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.008 * 0.022 ***
(0.024) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Market-to-book -0.049 *** -0.032 *** -0.038 *** -0.037 *** -0.042 *** -0.026 *** -0.028 ***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Leverage 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 **
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-interest income -0.033 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Loans -0.209 *** -0.125 *** -0.191 ** -0.131 *** -0.191 ** -0.196 *** -0.071
(0.077) (0.034) (0.096) (0.034) (0.078) (0.048) (0.106)
Loan loss provisions -2.334 ** -2.399 *** -2.381 *** -2.367 *** -2.349 *** -2.296 *** 1.762
(0.918) (0.666) (0.666) (0.666) (0.666) (0.853) (1.298)
Debt maturity -0.018 -0.175 *** 0.009 -0.090
(0.014) (0.043) (0.020) (0.063)
Deposits 0.161 *** -0.026 0.314 *** 0.215 ***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.051) (0.053)
Return on assets 0.034 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.037 *** 0.036 *** 0.045 *** 0.048 ***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 0.018 -0.003 *** -0.021 0.079 -0.842 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.046) (0.137) (0.337)
Liquidity -7.544 *** -3.709 *** -3.863 ** -4.286 *** -4.412 *** -5.716 *** -5.287 ***
(2.496) (1.186) (1.576) (1.199) (1.516) (1.337) (1.732)
SRISK -0.001 -0.087 ***
(0.002) (0.016)
Z-score 0.026 ** 0.116 ***
(0.013) (0.024)
Constant 3.289 *** 0.039 0.032 -0.060
(0.358) (0.035) (0.033) (0.143)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9112 9112 10032 5920
N cluster 1531
R2 0.3
Adj. R2 0.30
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Table VI: Regulatory environment and banks’ stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics as well
as regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold
return as our dependent variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks
from 74 countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream
while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables
come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all banks from our
sample and we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered
robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-
squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
OLS HLM OLS HLM OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
firm dev. country mean firm dev. country mean
Bank-level-characteristics
Lagged return -0.125 *** -0.004 -0.101 *** -0.150 *** -0.012 -0.107 *** -0.136 *** -0.093 *** -0.136 *** -0.139 *** -0.099 ***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
MES -0.184 ** -0.001 -0.762 *** -0.144 ** 0.010 -0.749 *** -0.179 ** -0.157 ** -0.178 ** -0.159 ** -0.187 **
(0.072) (0.045) (0.139) (0.072) (0.045) (0.148) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077)
Beta -0.223 ** 0.014 -0.521 *** -0.200 ** 0.022 -0.311 ** -0.250 *** -0.118 -0.195 ** -0.208 ** -0.101
(0.090) (0.052) (0.139) (0.091) (0.052) (0.135) (0.091) (0.092) (0.089) (0.092) (0.092)
Total assets -0.208 *** 0.002 -0.012 ** -0.200 *** 0.004 -0.002 -0.234 *** -0.199 *** -0.214 *** -0.202 *** -0.204 ***
(0.023) (0.003) (0.006) (0.023) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Market-to-book -0.050 *** -0.035 *** -0.038 *** -0.048 *** -0.037 *** -0.041 *** -0.051 *** -0.065 *** -0.050 *** -0.045 *** -0.062 ***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016)
Leverage 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-interest income -0.018 -0.005 -0.004 -0.026 -0.002 -0.001 -0.019 -0.008 -0.023 -0.022 -0.008
(0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Loans -0.236 *** -0.117 *** -0.140 -0.241 *** -0.122 *** -0.144 * -0.252 *** -0.197 ** -0.247 *** -0.236 *** -0.189 **
(0.073) (0.034) (0.086) (0.073) (0.034) (0.083) (0.074) (0.078) (0.074) (0.074) (0.078)
Loan loss provisions -1.764 * -1.986 *** -1.968 *** -2.577 *** -2.354 *** -2.337 *** -1.901 ** -1.783 * -2.221 ** -2.317 ** -1.999 *
(0.955) (0.685) (0.685) (0.948) (0.685) (0.685) (0.941) (1.082) (0.963) (0.971) (1.109)
Debt maturity -0.018 -0.024 * -0.077 -0.016 -0.016 -0.169 *** -0.015 -0.029 -0.020 -0.018 -0.032
(0.023) (0.014) (0.047) (0.023) (0.014) (0.045) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Deposits 0.199 ** 0.185 *** 0.107 *** 0.172 ** 0.188 *** 0.097 ** 0.191 ** 0.216 ** 0.210 ** 0.197 ** 0.229 ***
(0.083) (0.038) (0.040) (0.082) (0.038) (0.038) (0.082) (0.087) (0.083) (0.083) (0.087)
Return on assets 0.036 *** 0.036 *** 0.036 *** 0.034 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.036 *** 0.042 *** 0.035 *** 0.035 *** 0.041 ***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 0.021 -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 0.012 -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity -9.676 *** -3.705 ** -2.931 -7.654 *** -4.548 *** -5.002 *** -7.707 *** -9.705 *** -8.076 *** -7.749 ** -9.077 **
(3.591) (1.858) (2.131) (2.114) (1.213) (1.548) (2.171) (3.576) (2.216) (3.603) (3.666)
Regulatory environment
Private monitoring index -0.029 *** -0.027 *** -0.013 * -0.028 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Diversification Index -0.116 *** -0.037 *** -0.095 ***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.020)
Activity restrictions 0.034 ***
(0.006)
Official Supervisory Power 0.014 ** 0.015 **
(0.006) (0.006)
Entry requirements -0.057 *** -0.053 *** -0.042 **
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Constant 3.261 *** 0.207 *** 3.075 *** 0.068 * 3.135 *** 2.653 *** 3.501 *** 3.518 *** 3.204 ***
(0.362) (0.047) (0.363) (0.038) (0.368) (0.388) (0.367) (0.372) (0.419)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9670 9670 9835 9835 9765 8687 9762 9580 8567
N cluster 1495 1506 1507 1457 1503 1486 1439
R2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Adj. R2 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.35
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Table VII: Regressions of a bank’s stock performance and interconnectedness.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and a bank’s interconnectedness
with other banks, bank characteristics, and regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. We use
the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable. The sample consists of 1,659
publicly traded international banks from 74 countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thom-
son Reuters Financial Datastream while financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope
database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are re-
trieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions
include all banks from our sample and we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed
effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses,
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.
R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are
given in Appendix I.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Bank-level characteristics
Lagged return -0.201 *** -0.189 *** -0.214 *** -0.199 *** -0.21 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MES -0.187 ** -0.2 *** -0.165 ** -0.189 ** -0.19 **
(0.015) (0.010) (0.034) (0.015) (0.017)
Total assets -0.218 *** -0.228 *** -0.219 *** -0.233 *** -0.224 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-book -0.049 *** -0.048 *** -0.046 *** -0.048 *** -0.042 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.995) (0.912) (0.982) (0.716) (0.738)
Non-interest income -0.009 -0.003 -0.013 -0.01 -0.004
(0.734) (0.907) (0.643) (0.712) (0.893)
Loans -0.368 *** -0.338 *** -0.349 *** -0.355 *** -0.348 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loan loss provisions -2.93 ** -2.408 * -3.216 ** -2.904 ** -2.822 **
(0.018) (0.059) (0.013) (0.024) (0.030)
Debt maturity 0.01 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.008
(0.704) (0.820) (0.766) (0.837) (0.771)
Deposits 0.244 *** 0.242 *** 0.211 ** 0.247 *** 0.25 ***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.007)
Return on assets 0.037 *** 0.04 *** 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.041 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tier-1-capital -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity -10.679 *** -11.287 *** -9.678 *** -10.568 *** -9.442 **
(0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.029)
Interconnectedness -0.181 ** -0.17 ** -0.195 *** -0.17 ** -0.163 **
(0.014) (0.023) (0.008) (0.020) (0.028)
Regulatory environment
Private monitoring index -0.044 *** -0.031 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Diversification index -0.098 *** -0.07 ***
(0.000) (0.003)
Entry requirements -0.066 *** -0.064 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,078 7,768 7,902 7,843 7,696
R2 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34
Adj. R2 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34
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Table VIII: Systemic size and bank’s stock performance.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics as well as regulatory variables over the period
1999-2012. We use the banks’ log annual buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded
international banks from 74 countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial
accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics
are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample
and we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects using clustered robust standard errors (at the bank level). P-values
are given in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted
R-squared. Definitions of variables as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
Bank-level characteristics
Lagged return -0.129 *** -0.141 *** -0.131 *** -0.131 *** -0.082 *** -0.112 *** -0.138 *** -0.123 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MES -0.233 *** -0.224 *** -0.229 *** -0.203 *** -0.25 *** -0.201 *** -0.241 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Beta -0.392 *** -0.398 *** -0.384 *** -0.388 *** -0.284 *** -0.411 *** -0.374 *** -0.39 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Systemic size -43.847 -36.983 -40.431 -50.773 -199.782 ** -119.369 -77.285 -101.203
(0.280) (0.346) (0.341) (0.201) (0.049) (0.161) (0.398) (0.225)
Market-to-book -0.049 *** -0.046 *** -0.047 *** -0.049 *** -0.063 *** -0.047 *** -0.045 *** -0.047 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.694) (0.696) (0.725) (0.704) (0.700) (0.659) (0.635) (0.434)
Non-interest income -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.01 -0.019 -0.013
(0.536) (0.591) (0.502) (0.521) (0.953) (0.573) (0.275) (0.453)
Loans -0.259 *** -0.233 *** -0.254 *** -0.24 *** -0.165 ** -0.238 *** -0.243 *** -0.251 ***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Loan loss provisions -2.162 ** -2.44 *** -2.223 *** -2.076 ** -1.883 * -1.915 ** -2.781 *** -2.369 ***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.067) (0.032) (0.002) (0.009)
Deposits 0.434 *** 0.423 *** 0.42 *** 0.426 *** 0.413 *** 0.409 *** 0.38 *** 0.433 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return on assets 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.038 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Liquidity -8.467 *** -9.205 *** -8.413 *** -8.539 *** -12.245 *** -12.008 *** -8.091 *** -8.389 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆CoVaR 0
(0.960)
Regulatory environment
Governance (pca) 0.033 **
(0.042)
Governance 0.102 *
(0.077)
Official Supervisory Power 0.014 **
(0.020)
Private monitoring Index -0.033 ***
(0.000)
Diversification Index -0.129 ***
(0.000)
Entry requirements -0.051 ***
(0.000)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,149 9,108 10,149 10,149 8,793 9,782 9,951 9,875
R2 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.31
Adj. R2 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.31
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Table IX: Bank-specific and regulatory interactions.
The regressions estimate the relation between stock performance and bank characteristics, a bank’s
interconnectedness with other banks, and regulatory variables over the period 1999-2012. Table IV
reports the results of our baseline regressions over the period 1999-2012 using banks’ log annual
buy-and-hold return as our dependent variable. In addition to our multivariate analyses, we include
several interaction terms. The sample consists of 1,659 publicly traded international banks from
74 countries. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while
financial accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. Regulation variables come
from Barth et al. (2013a) and country characteristics are retrieved from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicator (WDI) Database. The regressions include all banks from our sample and
we apply panel regression with time-fixed and bank-fixed effects clustered robust standard errors
(at the bank level). P-values are given in parentheses, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared. Definitions of variables
as well as descriptions of the data sources are given in Appendix I.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
Bank-level-characteristics
Loans -0.270 *** -0.552 *** -0.496 *** -0.274 *** -0.273 *** -0.149 * -0.318 ***
(0.074) (0.127) (0.126) (0.075) (0.074) (0.079) (0.089)
Debt Maturity -0.014 0.032 0.017 -0.012 -0.015 -0.019 0.012
(0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
Tier-1-capital -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tier-1 leverage ratio -1.132 **
(0.492)
Tier-2 leverage ratio 2.559 ***
(0.894)
Interconnectedness 0.028
(0.068)
Crisis -0.079 *** -0.055 0.145 *** 0.113 *** 0.008 0.300 *** 0.006
(0.026) (0.052) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.062) (0.022)
Interactions
Tier-1-capital × crisis 1.238 ***
(0.300)
Tier-1 leverage × crisis 1.784 ***
(0.510)
Tier-2 leverage × crisis -3.118 **
(1.457)
Leverage × crisis -0.006 ***
(0.001)
Debt maturity × crisis 0.005
(0.040)
Loans × crisis -0.421 ***
(0.089)
Interconnect. × crisis -0.911 ***
(0.205)
Constant 2.864 *** 6.171 *** 5.585 2.885 *** 3.038 *** 2.927 *** 3.155 ***
(0.371) (0.790) (0.773) (0.374) (0.369) (0.373) (0.441)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,032 5,975 5,731 10,032 10,032 10,032 8,078
N cluster 1,519 1,104 1,072 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,391
R2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.34
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